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Abstract
We combine choice data in the ultimatum game with the expectations of pro-
posers elicited by subjective probability questions to estimate a structural model of
decision making under uncertainty. The model, estimated using a large represen-
tative sample of subjects from the Dutch population, allows both non-linear prefer-
ences for equity and expectations to vary across socio-economic groups. Our results
indicate that inequity aversion to one’s own disadvantage is an increasing and con-
cave function of the payoff difference. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the
population. Young and highly educated subjects have lower aversion for inequity
than other groups. Moreover, the model that uses subjective data on expectations
generates much better in and out of sample predictions than a model which assumes
that players have rational expectations.
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1 Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty plays an important role in economic theory and
practice. Economic models of choice under uncertainty typically assume that agents
combine their subjective probability distribution over uncertain outcomes with their
preferences to choose the optimal alternative. Experiments of proposal and response
have been used to understand the preference structure of decision makers. In such
games, the proposers’ payoffs not only depend on their own actions, but also on how re-
sponders will react, so that the proposers’ decisions will generally also depend on their
expectations about the responders’ behavior.
This paper shows, with the specific example of the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmitt-
berger and Schwarze, 1982), how the empirical content of experiments of proposal and
response behavior can be improved in several ways. First, as discussed by Manski
(2002), many experimental studies rely on assumptions regarding agents’ expectations
about other players’ actions (such as rational expectations) to identify preferences, since
observed choice data is generally not rich enough to uncover both expectations (’be-
liefs’) and preferences. An exception is Nyarko and Schotter (2002), who collected data
on actions and beliefs in a laboratory setting for repeated two player games with simul-
taneous decision making. They found that players are more likely to best-respond to
their stated beliefs than to beliefs inferred by the analyst from past decisions. Following
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Manski (2004), we address the identification problem
by collecting data on proposers’ subjective probability distributions over the actions of
responders, in addition to the usual experimental data. Thus, we ask proposers direct
questions on what they think are the probabilities that responders will make certain
decisions.
A second distinctive feature of our work is a rich econometric model in which pref-
erences and beliefs vary with (“observed”) heterogeneity captured by observable back-
ground characteristics as well as “unobserved” heterogeneity not captured by the ob-
served variables. Several papers provide point estimates of preference parameters, most
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of them based on experimental data collected in the lab with homogeneous samples (see,
e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2000). We extend the existing literature by proposing a model that
allows estimation of the entire distribution of preferences in a broad population. By us-
ing a large representative sample of the Dutch population rather than a convenience
sample of students as used in much of the experimental literature, we follow the re-
cent trend that has been established in the literature, e.g., Harrison, Lau, and Williams
(2002).1 This broad sample permits us to look into the issue of heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and beliefs.
Unlike other empirical choice models which incorporate subjective expectation data,
our model also allows for correlation between preferences and beliefs of proposers. For
example, we allow for the possibility that proposers with optimistic beliefs about the ac-
tions of responders also have systematically different preferences, leading to a spurious
correlation between beliefs and actions and inducing an endogeneity bias in the esti-
mates of the preference parameters. Avoiding this bias, we can make causal inferences
on the effect of beliefs on choices.
Our application addresses preferences for inequity aversion, an issue that has re-
ceived much attention in the recent experimental literature. Early research on social
preferences using hypothetical questions suggests that non-linear asymmetric inequity
aversion is prevalent in student populations (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman,
1989). Recent theories of inequity aversion have mostly focused on asymmetric linear
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Here, we use a model allowing for both
non-linear and asymmetric inequity aversion, distinguishing aversion resulting from
having a higher payoff from aversion that results from having a lower payoff than the
other player. Our model nests the preferences introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
which can explain the common finding in ultimatum game experiments that many pro-
posers make equitable offers, in contrast to the traditional sub-game perfect equilibrium
1Other studies using representative samples are Bellemare and Kröger (2007), and Fehr, Fischbacher,
Von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2002). They find that behavior in the investment game varies
across sub-groups of the Dutch and German populations, respectively.
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prediction that offers should not exceed the smallest positive amount that can be offered.
The latter “traditional” prediction rests on two assumptions: proposers maximize their
own expected monetary payoffs and expect responders not to reject any positive offer
(for example, because proposers think responders also maximize their own monetary
payoffs). Thus, both preferences that imply deviations from expected payoff maximiza-
tion and the belief that not everyone accepts any positive offer may explain why exper-
imental results are out of line with the traditional prediction. Our framework and the
data on beliefs are particularly suited to disentangle these two explanations.
Our sample was randomly divided into four groups: proposers and responders in
an ultimatum game and proposers and responders in a dictator game. The proposers
in the ultimatum game were asked how much they wanted to offer the responder, and
were also asked to state their subjective probabilities that other players would accept or
reject any possible offer. Decisions of responders in the ultimatum game were elicited
using the strategy method, asking responders to indicate their intended action for all
possible offers that could be made. Proposers in the dictator game were asked how
much they wanted to give to the other player, responders in this game had no active
role. Our structural model estimates combined all the information on the proposers and
responders in the ultimatum game. The proposer data in the dictator game were used
to test the quality of out of sample predictions of this model.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we found substantial deviations
between the average subjective acceptance probabilities reported by the proposers and
the actual acceptance rates in the responder data. Second, like Nyarko and Schotter
(2002), we found that the model which incorporates proposers’ subjective probability
distributions over the possible actions of responders fits the observed choice data bet-
ter than a model which assumes that proposers have rational expectations. Third, we
found substantial unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., heterogeneity in behavior and in ex-
pectations not attributable to observable characteristics) in the subjective probabilities
as well as in preferences for inequity aversion, with a significant negative correlation
between optimism in beliefs and inequity aversion to one’s own disadvantage, suggest-
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ing that persons with high optimism have a lower disutility from having less. Fourth,
we found that the subgroup of young subjects with a high education level and not par-
ticipating in the labor market, has the most egoistic preferences in the sense that their
predicted behavior in the experiment comes the closest to what is predicted by the tradi-
tional paradigm of maximizing one’s own payoff. This suggests that inequity aversion
is much larger in the Dutch population as a whole than extrapolations based on student
samples would suggest. Fifth, we found significant evidence that inequity aversion to
one’s own disadvantage is an increasing and concave function of the payoff difference
between players. Finally, we used the preference parameter estimates to construct out
of sample predictions of behavior in the dictator game. The predicted distribution of
choices is very close to the sample distribution of actual choices of proposers in the dic-
tator game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our experimental design and pro-
cedure are introduced in section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4
describes the data. The estimation results of the structural model are discussed in sec-
tion 5, where we also present simulations to assess the fit of the model and the role of
heterogeneity, compare models with subjective and rational expectations, and present
out of sample predictions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experiment
Subjects are members of the CentERpanel, an Internet survey managed by CentERdata,
consisting of about 2000 households who answer questions every weekend.2 There are
many reasons why the CentERpanel is an attractive medium to conduct experiments.
First, it provides access to a representative sample of a population, which is one of the
key features of our study. Second, the experiment was double blind as participants were
2For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
www.centerdata.nl. Computer screens from the original experiment (in Dutch) with translations appear
in the online appendix.
4
told that they would be anonymously matched and that their identities would not be
revealed to the experimenters. Finally, CentERdata reimburses the costs for answering
the questionnaire by crediting CentERpoints (hereafter CP; 100 CP = 1 Euro) to the re-
spondents’ bank accounts four times a year, allowing us to reimburse participants in a
convenient way.
We randomly assigned CentERpanel members to the “ultimatum game” or the “dic-
tator game.” In both games, a proposer suggested to a responder a split of an amount
of 1000 CP (10 Euros). We discretized the choice set of the proposer to eight allocations:
A ∈ {(1000, 0), (850, 150), (700, 300), (550, 450), (450, 550), ... , (0, 1000)}, where the first
and second amount denote the payoffs for the proposer and the responder, respectively.
We ruled out the equal split (500, 500) in order to force proposers to commit themselves
to offering either more or less than the equal split, a feature which intuitively should
help to increase the efficiency of our estimates.
In the dictator game, responders did not have an active role but had to accept the
amount offered by the proposer. In the ultimatum game, on the other hand, responders
could either accept or reject an offer. In our design, these decisions were elicited fol-
lowing the strategy method (Selten, 1967). Responders were asked whether they would
accept or reject each of the eight allocations that could be offered. The response which
corresponded to the actual decision of the proposer matched to this responder deter-
mined the payoff of both participants. The strategy method overcame the difficulty of
having CentERpanel members interact in real time and provided more information, as
responses to all eight possible allocations were elicited, including allocations that were
never or hardly ever chosen by the actual proposers.3
After all participants had made their decisions, proposers and responders were ran-
3McLeish and Oxoby (2004) found that decisions in the ultimatum game collected with the strategy
method were not statistically different from decisions made immediately after having received an offer.
Brandts and Charness (2000) did not find significant differences of choices in simple sequential games
between these two methods. On the other hand, such differences have been found for binary ultimatum
games (Güth, Huck, and Müller, 2001) and sequential bargaining games with costly punishment (Brosig,
Weiman, and Yang, 2003).
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domly matched and payoffs were computed based on the decisions of each pair. Payoffs
in the ultimatum game corresponded to the allocation chosen by the proposer if this al-
location was accepted by the responder. If it was rejected, both participants received
nothing. In the dictator game, players received the payoffs chosen by the proposer.
The beliefs of the proposers in the ultimatum game were elicited with a series of
subjective probability questions. To simplify their task, subjects were asked how many
out of 100 persons would accept each offer.4 To be able to account for framing effects,
proposers were randomly divided into groups that were asked for either their subjective
acceptance or their subjective rejection probabilities for all offers. To avoid the possibil-
ity that belief elicitation influences behavior, these questions were asked after players
had made their decisions. Subjects were not rewarded based on the accuracy of their
expectations.5
The experiment was conducted in March 2004. Contacted individuals received an
opening screen saying they were selected for an experiment carried out by a team of
university researchers. A detailed description of the game and the payoff structure fol-
lowed. Each person was informed that if participating, they would be randomly as-
signed to one of the roles and would be randomly matched to another panel member
playing the opposite role. The role was revealed once a panel member had agreed to
participate. We contacted 1410 panel members of whom 147 declined to participate. Of
the 1263 panel members who completed the experiment, we had to exclude 40 people
from the analysis because of missing information on some of their observable character-
istics. In total, we analyzed the data of 377 (260) proposers and 335 (251) responders in
the ultimatum (dictator) game.6 As announced before the experiment, each participant
4This follows Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (2000) who found that people are better at
working with natural frequencies than with percent probabilities.
5Several studies have found that rewarding subjects for the accuracy of their expectations using an
incentive compatible scoring rule does not produce significantly different elicited expectations; see Fried-
man and Massaro (1998) and Sonnemans and Offerman (2001).
6To balance the unequal numbers of players in both roles, some responders were randomly assigned
twice to a proposer. As with all other participants, these responders received payments resulting from
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received information on the outcome of the game and their final payoff two weeks after
the experiment, and this amount was later credited to their bank account.
3 An Empirical Model of Preferences and Beliefs
In this section we introduce a structural econometric model to explain the behavior of
proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, as well as the subjective acceptance
probabilities reported by the proposers in this game. Proposer behavior in the dictator
game was not used for estimation, but was used to evaluate the model’s potential for
out of sample predictions (see section 5). We allow for heterogeneity of both preferences
and beliefs, which can vary with observed characteristics such as age, education level,
labor force status, and gender (included in a vector xi) and with unobserved charac-
teristics, not captured by variables in the data set. We also allow choices to vary with
the person’s role, since preferences may vary with someone’s role in social interaction
(Goeree and Holt, 2000, and Gächter and Riedel, 2005).7 This enables us to investigate
how preferences vary with background characteristics and to test whether preferences
are role dependent.
Flexible preferences with inequity aversion
We assume that subjects have preferences with possibly non-linear asymmetric inequity
aversion. The utility of subject i from payoffs ysel f to him-or herself and yother to the
other player is given by:
vi = ysel f − α1i max
{
yother − ysel f , 0
}− α2i max
{




ysel f − yother, 0
}− β2i max
{
ysel f − yother, 0
}2 (1)
only one pairing (the first). The online appendix provides a summary table of our experimental design.
7In an alternating offer bargaining experiment, Goeree and Holt (2000) found that proposers have a
significantly higher disutility from having less than responders. In a two person bargaining experiment,
Gächter and Riedel (2005) observed that the correlation of expectations about what fair divisions are and
bargaining behavior varies between roles.
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For subjects who only care about their own payoff, α1i, β1i, α2i, and β2i would be zero.
The linear inequity model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is a special case of equation (1),
with α2i = β2i = 0.8
We use the following specifications:
α1i = exp(x′iα1 + u
α
i ), (2)





where x̃i = [1, Responderi]
′ is a vector consisting of the intercept and a dummy “Respon-
deri” taking a value of 1 for responders and 0 for proposers. This vector is combined
with a person’s observable characteristics in the vector xi = [x̃ ′i , x
′
i ]
′.9 The terms uαi and
uβi reflect unobserved heterogeneity, assumed to be independent of error terms and of xi
with a bivariate normal distribution with means zero and an arbitrary covariance ma-
trix. We expected a positive correlation between uαi and u
β
i since people with a general
aversion to inequity might have large values for both.
As explained in section 2, each proposer had eight choices (j = 1, ... , 8), involving
their own payoffs ysel f (1), ... , ysel f (8). Proposers in the ultimatum game did not know
whether their offer would be accepted. We assume expected utility maximization, where
proposer i uses his own subjective probability Qij that offer j is accepted. Since utility
is zero if the offer is rejected, the expected utility of offer j is given by Qijvij where vij
denotes person i-s utility of payoffs (ysel f (j), yother(j)) (cf. equation (1)) with yother(j) =
1000− ysel f (j).
Perfect optimization would imply that proposer i chooses the option j that max-
imizes Qijvij. To allow for sub-optimal choices, we add idiosyncratic error terms λiεij
8In principle, it would also be possible to make vi nonlinear in ysel f or include interactions of ysel f
and ysel f − yother. We did not pursue this and expect that it would be hard to obtain accurate parameter
estimates, since the utility function is identified only up to a monotonic transformation.
9We also estimated the model with α2i and β2i depending on the complete vector xi but this gave no
significant improvement in the likelihood. See footnote 18 below.
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and assume that proposer i chooses the option j that maximizes Qijvij + λiεij. We assume
that the errors εij are independent of each other and of other variables in the model (i.e.
(uαi , u
β
i ) and xi), and that the difference of any two εij across options follows a logistic
distribution.
Responder i has to trade off the utility of accepting or rejecting each offer yresp(j)
(j = 1, ... , 8). The utility of rejecting is zero, and the responder’s utility vij of accepting
offer j immediately follows from equations (1) and (2). A perfectly utility maximizing
responder would thus accept offer j if and only if vij > 0. Again, we assume that the
responder accepts offer j if vij + λiεij > 0, where λiεij denotes idiosyncratic error terms
which are assumed to follow a logistic distribution and to be independent across of-
fers. The random effects uαi and u
β
i lead to correlation between the choices of the same
responder for different offers.
The size of the noise parameter λi drives the likelihood of sub-optimal choice. We
specify the noise parameter λi as λi = exp(x′iλ), thus allowing the noise level to vary
with background characteristics and role (since xi also includes the role dummy).
Beliefs
One way to incorporate beliefs in the model is to simply plug reported acceptance or
rejection probabilities into the expected utility comparisons. This would have been jus-
tified if reported probabilities exactly equalled the probabilities that proposers use in
making decisions, and were independent of errors and (uαi , u
β
i ). In that case, the subjec-
tive probabilities Qij are observed exogenous variables and the preference distribution
could be estimated without modelling the beliefs.
This approach is not valid for two reasons. First, there appears to be a framing ef-
fect of asking either rejection or acceptance probabilities: the distribution of reported
acceptance probabilities differed substantially from the distribution of acceptance prob-
abilities implied by reported rejection probabilities (see next section). This framing effect
cannot have affected the answers to the choice questions (since the “framed” questions
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on the beliefs were asked after the choices had been made), so that reported probabilities
must first be purged of the framing bias before using them to construct the expected util-
ities in the choice model. Second, the acceptance probabilities may have been affected
by unobserved factors that also drive the unobserved preference heterogeneity terms uαi
and uβi . Early experiments in cognitive psychology (cf. Rapoport and Wallsten, 1972)
already showed that subjective probabilities are correlated with utilities over outcomes.
If acceptance probabilities are taken as exogenous in the choice model, this correlation
would induce an endogeneity bias.
Both issues are dealt with by modelling preferences and acceptance probabilities
jointly. We allow these probabilities to vary with the same individual characteristics
xi as used for the preference parameters. Since (true as well as reported) probabilities
may well be zero or one, we allow for censoring at 0 and 1, as in a two-limit tobit model.
First, we model the true (unobserved) probabilities Qij used in expected utility maxi-
mization, not affected by framing or other reporting errors:
Q∗ij = x
′
iδ + γj + u
P
i
Qij = 0 if Q∗ij < 0
= Q∗ij if 0 < Q
∗
ij < 1
= 1 if Q∗ij > 1
The censoring guarantees that the true probabilities are between 0 and 1. The choice
option effects γj are expected to increase with j for amounts below the equal split, since
proposers probably realize that acceptance probabilities rise if the amount offered to the
other player increases towards an equal split. Whether or not γj also increases with j
beyond the equal split is not a priori clear, since acceptance probabilities and the beliefs
about them can increase or decrease depending on the extent of inequity aversion. The
unobserved heterogeneity term uPi reflects the proposer’s optimism. We assume that




i ) is 3-variate normal with mean zero and an arbitrary
covariance matrix, independent of error terms and xi.
Reported probabilities Pij can deviate from the true probabilities Qij because of fram-
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ing bias or an idiosyncratic reporting error εPij. The latter is assumed to be i.i.d. normally
distributed and independent of everything else. The framing bias at offer j is modeled
in a symmetric way, using a parameter φj. We assume that a positively framed question
induces a bias opposite to the bias of a negatively framed question and that the expecta-
tions used by proposers in making their decisions are in between. Therefore, we define
a “framing” variable Fi as 1 or -1 if belief questions are framed in terms of accepting and









Pij = 0 if P∗ij < 0
= P∗ij if 0 < P
∗
ij < 1
= 1 if P∗ij > 1
The model for Pij is essentially a two-limit tobit model. The censoring guarantees that
reported probabilities are between 0 and 1. Imposing symmetry on the framing effects
is necessary to identify the framing parameters and the parameters γj in the true prob-
abilities from reported beliefs alone (i.e., without relying on the data on choices and
assumptions on preferences).
4 Descriptive statistics
Table I describes the individual characteristics included in xi. About half of our partic-
ipants were men. The median age in the sample was 48 years, with a range of 18 to
89. We used dummies for three age categories. Education level was captured by three
dummies, comprising approximately the same numbers of participants. Similarly, we
distinguished three income categories (based upon a categorical income question in the
survey) and four categories of occupational status.
Figure 1 presents the distributions of amounts offered by proposers in the ultimatum
and dictator games. These distributions exhibite two well-known features (see, e.g.,
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Camerer, 2003): First, proposers sent positive amounts, with the mode around the equal
split, and with very few amounts much above that. Second, the distribution of amounts
offered to the other player in the ultimatum game stochastically dominated that in the
dictator game. A chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis that both distributions were
the same (p-value = 0.000).
Table II presents the choices of responders in the ultimatum game. Each line repre-
sents a choice sequence (obtained using the strategy method), with the frequencies in the
final column. Choice sequences were grouped into two categories.10 The biggest group
(52.8%) was the group of “threshold players,” who accepted any proposal above a cer-
tain amount. The second group (43.3%) was “plateau players,” who accepted offers in a
range excluding both the minimum and maximum amounts that could be offered. The
width of the plateau is informative of the degree of inequity aversion to both one’s own
and the other player’s disadvantage, as subjects rejected offers giving them either much
lower or much higher amounts than the proposer. Plateau response behavior in the ulti-
matum game has been reported by Huck (1999), Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2003), Tracer
(2004), Bahry and Wilson (2006), and Hennig-Schmidt, Li and Yang (2008).11 These stud-
ies indicated that broad subject pools and the presence of strong social norms are the
most important reasons for non-monotonic response behavior.12
The sizeable fraction of plateau responders had an immediate consequence for the
aggregate acceptance rates, presented at the bottom of Table II. The acceptance rates
increased from 5% for low offers to above 90% for proposals around the equal split, but
then declined to just above 55% when the complete amount was offered to the responder.
10A small (3.9%) group exhibited what we call inconsistent behavior, with no systematic response pat-
tern. A table containing their responses appears in the online appendix. These responses were left out of
the empirical analysis. Estimates of the model including them gave very similar results.
11Andreoni and Miller (2002) reported laboratory evidence of non-monotonic preferences in dictator
games suggesting that people dislike even favorable inequity.
12In their video experiments, Hennig-Schmidt, Li, and Yang (2008) further found that moral concerns
(e.g., losing face) and a perceived low probability of receiving high offers are other motivations for non-
monotonic response behavior.
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Figure 2 presents the means of the subjective acceptance probabilities for each offer
separately for those who got the accept and the reject frames. Overall, proposers stated
lower expected acceptance rates when asked in terms of acceptance than when asked
in terms of rejection. This effect was smallest for amounts sent of 450 and 550 CP. We
are not aware of studies that have found framing effects in expected behavior of others,
although framing effects on expected own future decisions have been reported in several
different contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986; Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987).
The widely documented fact that “losses loom larger than gains” may explain the fram-
ing effect we found (see, e.g., Thaler, 1991, and Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). From the
point of view of proposers, the responders’ utility gain of accepting (say) 150 CP may be
perceived to be smaller than the responders’ utility loss of rejecting 150 CP. This would
be consistent with lower subjective acceptance probabilities in the acceptance frame rel-
ative to the rejection frame.13
Interestingly, many proposers in the ultimatum game anticipated the presence of
plateau types in the responder population – the acceptance rates expected by proposers
decline with offers in excess of an equal split. This result is all the more remarkable since
proposers have not had a chance to learn the population pattern of response.14
5 Econometric results
We estimated the model in section 3 by maximum simulated likelihood.15 To assess
the impact of using the subjective probability distributions in the choice model, we es-
timated a second model assuming that proposers in the ultimatum game had rational
expectations about the responders’ acceptance rates. In that model, beliefs of all pro-
posers were equal to observed aggregate acceptance rates of responders (cf. the bottom
13We thank Peter Wakker for the extensive discussion we had on this issue.
14Anticipation of non-monotonic response behavior has also been documented by Hennig-Schmidt, Li,
and Yang (forthcoming) for proposers in ultimatum bargaining group experiments.
15Results were generated using Ox version 3.40 (Doornik, 2005). See the online appendix for details on
the estimation procedure.
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row of Table II). This model was estimated without the equation for beliefs.
Model fit
Table III presents the distributions of observed and predicted offers for different age
and education levels. For the complete sample (columns 1-2), our model successfully
predicted both distributions. In particular, it correctly separated the probability mass of
fair offers of 450 CP and 550 CP, and correctly predicted the decline in acceptance prob-
abilities for very advantageous offers. Comparing the decisions of young (<35 years;
columns 3-4) and old (>54 years; columns 5-6) individuals confirmed the quality of the
fit. For example, it reproduced the large difference between both age groups’ responses
for offers above the equal split, with much more plateau behavior for the old than for
the young. Similarly, the differences between high and low educated responders were
quite well predicted.
Out of sample predictions
Because our model was estimated using only data from decisions in the ultimatum
game, we could use the model for out-of sample prediction of the offer distribution
of proposers in the dictator game and compared them with the data in that game. De-
cisions in the dictator game were simulated using the model with the estimated prefer-
ences (estimated using only ultimatum game data), and setting acceptance probabilities
to one. The last two columns of Table III present the actual and simulated distributions.
The model correctly predicted the modal offer of 450 CP in the dictator game, although
it under-estimated the corresponding frequency, while over-estimating the number of
offers of 550 CP. Hence the model had some difficulties in allocating the exact probabil-
ity mass between offers of 450 CP and 550 CP, but otherwise predicted dictator behavior
quite well.
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Subjective vs. rational expectations
The usefulness of incorporating subjective probabilities is illustrated by comparing the
results above with the fit obtained by the model assuming that proposers have rational
expectations. The online appendix presents the fit of the latter model. Both models gave
a similar fit of the acceptance probabilities of responders and of the offer distribution
of older proposers in the ultimatum game. However, the model with rational expecta-
tions gave a substantially worse fit of the offer distribution of young proposers in the
ultimatum game. In particular, it underpredicted offers of 450 CP and 550 CP by 7.5
and 5.5 percentage-points, respectively, and overpredicted offers of 150 CP by almost 11
percentage-points. The model using subjective expectations predicted this distribution
much better. The two models also produced different (out-of sample) predictions of the
offer distribution in the dictator game. While the model with subjective expectations
predicted the shape of this distribution quite well, the model with rational expectations
placed too large of a probability (67.1%) on offers of 0 CP, and almost no probability on
offers of 450 CP. Hence, the model with subjective expectations fits and predicts sub-
stantially better than a model with rational expectations.
Parameter estimates
Table IV presents parameter estimates of the model with subjective expectations.16 We
only discuss the main significant effects. The null hypothesis that individual charac-
teristics affect α1i and β1i in the same way was rejected (χ211 = 33.58, p-value = 0.000).
Surprisingly, there were hardly any significant effects of individual characteristics on
inequity aversion to one’s own disadvantage (α); the only exception was that the retired
were more inequity averse than others. More variables were significant in the equation
for inequity at the other player’s disadvantage (β1i). Particularly, older respondents and
those with less education were more inequity averse to the other player’s disadvan-
tage than younger and more highly educated subjects; higher income groups were less
16Estimates for the model imposing rational expectations are in the online appendix.
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inequity averse than lower income subjects. We found no gender differences for disu-
tility of having less and only weak differences for disutility of having more. This is in
line with evidence from ultimatum games (e.g., Solnick, 2001) and dictator games (e.g.,
Bolten and Katok, 1995, and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) using student subjects who
did not know the gender of the other players.17
We found significant evidence of non-linear aversion to inequity to one’s own dis-
advantage for both proposers and responders – the estimates of α2 are negative.18 No
nonlinearities in preferences were found for inequity aversion at the other player’s dis-
advantage.19 Interestingly, we found no significant evidence of non-linear aversion to
inequity in the model imposing rational expectations (presented in the online appendix).
Finally, role differences in the parameters α1, β1, α2 and β2 were jointly significant
(χ24 = 45.63; p-value=0.000), implying that responders had a slightly stronger disutil-
ity for having less than proposers. This result might be due to the fact that preferences
depend on opportunities and on self-serving notions of fairness.20
Figure 3 sketches the implied population distribution of inequity aversion to one’s
own and the other player’s disadvantage. They are based on simulating disutilities for
each difference between one’s own and other player’s payments for all subjects in the
sample, accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Each graph presents
the mean and the first and third quartiles of the corresponding simulated disutitilies.
The disutility of having more than the other player is relatively homogeneous in the
population and almost always positive and close to linear in (ysel f − yother). There is
much more dispersion in the disutility of having less than the other player. In line
with the negative estimates of α2, this disutility is a concave function of (yother − ysel f ),
17Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found no significant differences in dictator giving between male and
female students for experimental parameters which are comparable to our design.
18A likelihood ratio test did not reject the null hypothesis that α2 and β2 do not depend on xi (χ220 =
26.56, p-value = 0.1481).
19The parameter β2 for proposers and responders was jointly insignificant (χ22 = 1.62, p-value = 0.105);
both non-linearity parameters for proposers and responders were jointly significant (χ24 = 78.04, p-value
= 0.000).
20We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. See also Babcock and Loewenstein (1997).
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and can be negative for a substantial group of subjects, particularly for high amounts
offered.21 This may reflect the fact that respondents were concerned about efficiency,
making them more reluctant to reject any offer.22 If efficiency is an additional motiva-
tion, then its effect would be captured by the inequity aversion parameters, possibly
shifting down the predicted disutilities by a constant for all offers. Our experimental
design does not allow us to separately identify this, however.
The estimates driving λi suggest that male proposers made more errors than female
proposers although the difference was significant only at the 10% level. Other differ-
ences between socioeconomic groups were insignificant, and we thus found no evidence
that the extent to which participants’ understanding of the game varies across socioeco-
nomic groups.23
The effects of individual characteristics on beliefs were all insignificant. They were
also jointly insignificant (Wald test statistic χ210 = 7.043, p-value = 0.721). This result im-
plies that expectations, i.e., the perception of the same uncertain situation, did not vary
with background characteristics. As expected from the raw data, estimates of framing
effect parameters φj were negative and significant except for proposals near the equal
split.24
Finally, unobserved heterogeneity played a significant role, as shown by the posi-




i . The share of total unexplained
variation in beliefs of proposers in the ultimatum game captured by individual atti-
tudes was 35.7%.25 As conjectured, uαi and u
β
i were significantly positively correlated,
indicating that individuals with a stronger dislike of inequity to their disadvantage also
disliked inequity to their advantage. Interestingly, we found that the correlation of uPi
21Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) also reported evidence suggesting that inequity aver-
sion to one’s own disadvantage is an increasing and concave function of the level of disadvantage.
22See Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for evidence on efficiency concerns in dictator games.
23A joint test did not reject the null hypothesis that λi does not depend on xi (χ210=11.79, p-value=0.299).
We also estimated a model where λi included interactions between the age and education variables. We
found no significant improvement in the log-likelihood function (χ24 = 4.86, p-value = 0.302).
24They were also jointly significant: the Wald test gives χ28 = 231.82, p-value = 0.000.










with uαi was significant and negative, implying that proposers who are optimistic about
the acceptance rates of responders had lower levels of inequity aversion to their own
disadvantage.
Predicted marginal disutility of inequity
The main qualitative implications of our model are graphed in Figure 4. The left graph
plots three average predicted marginal disutilities from having less. The dashed line
in each graph plots the predicted marginal disutility averaged over all players in the
game.26 We found that the predicted marginal disutility is positive but decreases with
the payoff difference, reflecting that the level of inequity aversion is an increasing and
concave function of the level of one’s own disadvantage. The bold line presents the
predicted marginal disutility averaged over subjects below 35 years of age with a high
level of education. We found little difference with the predicted disutilities in the popu-
lation. The dotted line presents the (constant) average marginal disutility calibrated by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) under the assumption that disutility to one’s own disadvan-
tage is linear in the payoff difference.27 We found that the Fehr and Schmidt calibration
is similar to our predictions for low, but not for high levels of inequity.
The right graph of Figure 4 plots the corresponding average predicted marginal disu-
tility from having more than the other player. In line with our model estimates, we
found that the average predicted marginal disutilities are approximately linear in the
payoff difference, suggesting no significant non-linear relationship between inequity to
other’s disadvantage and the level of inequity. On the other hand, young and highly
educated subjects had a significantly lower marginal disutility to other’s disadvantage.
Interestingly, their average predicted marginal disutility was very close to the average
marginal disutility calibrated by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) mainly based upon studies
26The predicted marginal disutilities for player i of having less and having more are α̂1i + 2α̂2i(yother −
ysel f ) and β̂1i + 2β̂2i(ysel f − yother), respectively.
27Their calibrated multinomial distributions for α and β were: α ∈ {0(0.3), 0.5(0.3), 1(0.3), 4(0.1)} and




To better understand the interaction between preferences and expectations in sub-groups
of the population, we used the estimates of the model with subjective expectations to
predict the choice distributions for four groups of non-working men: below 35 years of
age with either a university degree or high vocational training (group 1, close to a stu-
dent sample), below 35 years of age with a primary or lower vocational degree (group
2), above 54 years of age with a university or higher vocational degree (group 3), and
above 54 years of age with a primary or lower vocational degree (group 4).
Predicted offer distributions in the ultimatum and dictator games are presented in
Figure 5. For dictators, beliefs were irrelevant and offers directly revealed underlying
preferences. In line with the estimates, the young and educated dictator-proposers made
the most selfish offers. The graphs reveal that age differences had a stronger effect on
dictator offers than educational differences, in line with the parameter estimates. In
the ultimatum game, offers not only reflected preferences but also beliefs. The model
predicted that all four groups of proposers make predominantly “fair” offers, i.e., at the
equal split. Thus, it seems that young and educated subjects made fair offers for strategic
reasons, since lower offers had a smaller subjective probability of being accepted. On
the other hand, older and less educated individuals made fair offers because of their
preferences - they had large inequity aversion.
Figure 6 presents the predicted acceptance probabilities of responders in the ultima-
tum game. All subgroups had similar acceptance probabilities of offers below 550 CP, in
line with the parameter estimates which revealed no significant age or education differ-
ences in α1i. Acceptance probabilities of offers above 550 CP reflected the differences in
β1i. The acceptance probabilities for young and highly educated responders remained
above 80%, but were much smaller for older subjects. Again, differences were smaller
across education levels than across age groups. Overall, the graphs predict that plateau
19
behavior is a predominant response strategy for older and less educated subjects, while
threshold behavior is common among the young and highly educated.
6 Conclusion
We combined data on decisions and beliefs to formulate a structural micro-econometric
model separately identifying flexible preferences with non-linear inequity aversion and
subjective expectations.
Our results indicated that the model which combined these data fits and predicts the
decisions well and better than a model which assumes rational expectations, i.e., that
proposers’ beliefs were equal to the observed aggregate acceptance rates of responders.
Contrary to the model with rational expectations, the model with subjective expecta-
tions also revealed a significant non-linear relationship between aversion to one’s own
disadvantage and the level of inequity. These results suggested that subjective probabil-
ity data, although suffering from the problem of a substantial framing bias, can be useful
to better predict and understand behavior in simple games of proposal and response.
Our data also revealed that a large number of responders rejected offers which give
them more than the proposer, suggesting strong aversion to inequity at other’s disad-
vantage. Interestingly, this non-monotonicity in responder behavior appeared to have
been – qualitatively at least – anticipated by proposers in the game. We further found
that a substantial part of the non-monotonicity in responder’s behavior could be ex-
plained by important subject pool effects. Inequity aversion, in particular aversion to
other’s disadvantage, rises with age and falls with education level. Moreover, we found
that young and highly educated participants represent one of the most selfish subgroups
of the population under study. This suggests that care must be exerted before making
population inferences based on convenience samples of students commonly used in lab-
oratory experiments. It also implies that future research is warranted to explain these
differences (for example, is the age effect a cohort effect or a true age effect?) and to ver-
ify them in other ways, such as actual behavior in society (giving to charity, volunteer
20
work, etc.)
Our estimates imply that the average inequity aversion preferences of the young
and highly educated were very similar to Fehr and Schmidt’s calibrated distribution
based upon lab experiments, although it seems that our sample made fewer zero offers
than students in typical lab experiments. A thorough analysis comparing Internet ex-
periments with “identical” lab experiments (see e.g., Bellemare and Kröger, 2007), also
focusing on error rates and inconsistent choices, is left for future research. Another ques-
tion that can be addressed in future research is whether experience with these kind of
experiments reduces inconsistencies and plateau behavior.
Finally, it has been argued that the ultimatum game is not a proper environment
to test specific models of fairness (see Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie, 2003). While our
focus has been on estimating extended Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, our data
could possibly be used to fit equally well other models of fairness proposed in the liter-
ature (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000 and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007). Future
research should aim to collect richer data, possibly by enlarging the choice sets available
to players. Such data could then be used to formally test the Fehr and Schmidt model (or
some other model) by extending the approach presented here. This would allow the de-
termination of the most relevant preferences that characterize heterogeneity in behavior





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table II: Observed choice sequences for responders in the ultimatum game.
0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000 N
Threshold behavior (N=177)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 30
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 89
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Plateau behavior (N=145)
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 20
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 22
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 61
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 8
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 4
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Aggregate acceptance rates
0.05 0.15 0.32 0.93 0.91 0.68 0.58 0.55
Note: The table columns present the acceptance decision (coded as 1 if accepted) for all
8 possible offers. N denotes the number of observations.
There were 335 responders in the ultimatum game. The responses of 13 participants













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000
Amounts offered
Ultimatum game Dictator game
Figure 2: Proposers’anticipated acceptance probabilities in the ultimatum game col-












0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000
Subjective acceptance probabilities
Accept framing Reject framing
26









0 200 400 600 800 1000
Inequity
















Note: Predicted average disutilities of having less (left) and of having more (right) for
the whole population, 25th percentile, mean, and 75 percentile.
















0 200 400 600 800 1000
Inequity
Young & high educ. All

















0 200 400 600 800 1000
Inequity
Young & high educ. All
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Having more
Note: Predicted average marginal disutilities of having less (left) and having more
(right) for the whole population (dashed lines), only young [below 35 years of age]
and high educated subjects (full lines), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predictions (dot-
ted lines).
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0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000
Old and low educated (Group 4)
Simulated offers
Ultimatum Dictator
Note: Predicted offers by proposers in the ultimatum and dictator game for four groups
of non working men (group 1: <35 years, high; group 2: <35 years, low; group 3: >54
years, high; group 4: >54 years, low).
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0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000
Old and low educated (Group 4)
Simulated acceptance probabilities
Note: Predicted acceptance rates of responders in the ultimatum game for four groups
of non working men (group 1: <35 years, high; group 2: <35 years, low; group 3: >54
years, high; group 4: >54 years, low).
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